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Abstract 
 
We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to 
compare the behavior of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts 
in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a 
large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003-2010 and 1994-
2011 and we contrast co-ops behavior with the overall trend in the industries in which 
they operate. Our sample’s evidence suggests that the cooperative’s behavior has a 
stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike 
profit-maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment 
when facing shocks. Production co-ops look better equipped than their profit-
maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been 
very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have 
significantly increased their own equity during “good” years instead of distributing 
large dividends to their members.  
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1. Introduction 
 One of the worse economic crises of all times has still to end. Since the 
dramatic fall in 2009, several economies are far from making up for the reduction in 
GDP and subsequent recession. Employment is suffering from the poor 
macroeconomic performance associated with the meager trend in aggregate demand. 
The unfolding of the deepest economic slump since the Great Depression raises many 
questions about factors acting countercyclically, especially as far as employment is 
concerned. Among these factors, one may reasonably include the characteristics of 
the employers. For instance, it is worth testing how firms of different ilk react to 
downturns like the ones still hitting many economies during this lasting recession. 
 Among firms that are supposed to care about goals other than profits, we shall 
consider the cooperative firms (sometimes defined as labor-managed or workers’ 
firms). Their presence is important in many countries and their performance is still 
under scrutiny by many scholars and practitioners.
1
 In many European countries we 
are actually observing a resurgence of interest in cooperative firms because they seem 
to perform better than conventional firms in responding to the long slump.  
 For example, in France the creation of new co-ops in the building industry 
achieved a faster pace in the last years. The top 100 French co-ops increased their 
sales by 4% and the number of employees from 674,000 to 750,000 (+ 11.2%).
2
 
 In Spain, one of the countries more deeply hit by the crisis, in the period 2008-
2012, employment fell by 9.6% “only” in the co-ops, while the reduction was more 
than double in the rest of the economy (- 19.5%). Moreover, in the last five years 
Spanish cooperatives experienced a twenty percent increase in the number of their 
members.
3
 
                                                          
1 See Perotin (2012) and Zamagni and Zamagni (2010) for recent overviews.  
2
 http://economiesocialequebec.ca/?module=document&uid=1623 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/social/2012/01/12/09010-20120112ARTFIG00506-les-cooperatives-ont-
resiste-a-la-crise.php 
 
3 http://blogs.elpais.com/la-larga-marcha-de-la-ue/2012/06/las-cooperativas-resisten-mejor-la-
crisis.html 
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 According to Cecop, the largest European association of national co-ops 
associations, the above trends seem to be observed also in other European countries, 
confirming that co-ops are affording the crisis better than conventional firms, 
especially as far as employment is concerned. Furthermore, no CECOP affiliated co-
op has stopped its activity in the last years.
4
 
 In this paper we would like to detect and explain the reaction of co-ops’ 
employment to positive and negative shocks in aggregate demand.  
 To start with, we notice that cooperative firms operate and cohabit with 
conventional firms in many markets. Hence, in the next section we briefly survey the 
theoretical insights of the literature on mixed oligopolies, i.e. industries in which 
pure
5
 cooperative firms (assumed to maximize net surplus per worker/member) and 
profit-making firms coexist and compete. The choice of focusing on this literature is 
dictated by the straightforward evidence that mixed markets are what we observe in 
the real world.   
 Given the ambiguity of testable predictions stemming from theory, in section 3 
we switch to actual markets. Specifically, we investigate the trend of a large sample 
of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003-2010 and 1994-2011. The 
choice of this sample is not only motivated by the better quality of the available data 
with respect to other countries, but also by the fact that Italy accounts for the largest 
number of cooperative firms in Europe.
6
 We examine the time series of sales and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
http://www.eleconomista.es/espana/noticias/4028943/06/12/Los-socios-de-las-cooperativas-crecen-
un-20-impulsados-por-la-crisis.html 
 
4 http://www.cecop.coop/public_docs/RaportCriseEN.pdf 
 
5 By pure cooperative firm we mean what Sertel (1982) called workers’ enterprise; that is one in 
which “its members are all workers and its workers are all members of the firm”. 
 
6 According to Cecop statistics, Italy leads the ranking with more than 40,000 co-ops followed by 
Spain (about 24,000) and France (about 21,000). 
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employment of a group of almost pure
7
 workers’ enterprises and we contrast them 
with the overall trend in the industries where they operate.  
 Our empirical evidence allows us to argue that, facing exogenous shocks in 
aggregate demand, the cooperatives’ behavior has a stabilizing effect on employment. 
Unlike conventional firms, workers’ firms seem to be adjusting pay (at least to 
members) more than employment when facing exogenous shocks. This has a 
stabilizing effect on employment. These conclusions are consistent with similar 
findings emerging from recent applied research in this field.  
 Moreover, there is another reason why production co-ops seem better equipped 
in tackling the long recession than their profit-maximizing counterparts: co-ops have 
been very cautious in their profit policies over time. As we show in section 4 with the 
help of an 18-years long time series of a large sample of Italian co-ops, they have 
significantly increased their own equity during “good” years instead of distributing 
large dividends to their members. In the current “bad” years, such an attitude allows 
co-ops to protect workers and especially members more effectively than firms used to 
distribute substantial dividends to their stock-holders. Section 5 summarizes our main 
conclusions, some limitations of our empirical investigation and directions for further 
research. 
 
 
2. Workers’ Firms and Mixed Oligopolies 
 Since Ward (1958) seminal paper, most of the theoretical literature on 
cooperative firms has modeled them as agents maximizing surplus per 
worker/member.
8
 As we know, if the firm does not affect the wage rate, this amounts 
to maximize the profit per worker. If the working time per worker is fixed, under 
                                                          
7 The co-ops of our sample are almost pure as their average membership ratio (members/workers) is 
high but less than one. 
 
8 To be more precise, the short run objective function of such firms is taken as revenue, net of fixed 
costs, per worker. Workers coincide with members of the co-op, which is the case Sertel (1982) 
defines as “workers’ enterprise”. 
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perfect competition, Ward proved that the co-op’s supply function is decreasing in 
output price.  
 Such celebrated result is well-known as the “perverse effect” of the cooperative 
firm. A similar result has been proved also under monopoly by Gal-Or et al. (1980) 
and Ireland and Law (1982).
9
 We may summarize this stream of literature by saying 
that the cooperative behavior (i.e., maximization of profit per worker) in “extreme” 
market structures (perfect competition and monopoly) yields perverse effects.
10
  
 The empirical evidence supporting such perverse effects is basically negligible. 
However, workers’ firms do not operate in perfectly competitive markets nor in 
monopolies but in oligopolistic mixed industries. Hence, if one aims at testing 
theoretical results in the currently observable industries, then one needs modeling 
oligopolistic markets in which cooperative producers interact with profit-maximizing 
firms. Therefore, models of mixed oligopoly are the appropriate frames to work with 
and to use for producing testable predictions.  
 A mixed oligopoly is a market where a homogeneous or differentiated good is 
supplied by a “small” number of firms and the objective function of at least one of 
them differs from that of the other firms.
11
 To the best of our knowledge, the first 
model investigating the strategic interaction between a Profit-Maximizing Firm 
(PMF) and a Workers Firm (WF) has been proposed by Miyamoto (1982). He models 
a homogeneous duopoly where a PMF plays a Cournot game with a WF maximizing 
net income per worker. Miyamoto also provides a taxonomy of the comparative 
statics properties of the Cournot equilibrium of such mixed oligopoly.   
                                                          
 
9  See Bonin and Putterman (1987). 
 
10 Hill and Waterson (1983) are probably the first to study an oligopolistic industry formed by 
workers firms only. However, they do not perform comparative statics exercises to find out the 
presence of perverse effects. 
 
11 See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) also for a survey of the early literature on concentrated markets 
in which profit-maximizing firms coexist with welfare-maximizing enterprises. 
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 Especially in the early ‘90s, several papers have dealt with mixed oligopolies: 
for instance, Mai and Hwang (1989), Horowitz (1991), Cremer and Cremer (1992), 
Delbono and Rossini (1992), Okuguchi (1993). It may be easily checked that in these 
last papers the comparative statics properties of the Cournot equilibrium all fit quite 
squarely Miyamoto’s taxonomy. 
 Among such properties, we are interested in stressing that in a mixed 
homogeneous oligopoly operating according to Cournot rules, perverse effects may 
or may not feature the WF equilibrium behavior, depending on the features of the 
short-run production function vis-à-vis the demand function.  
 The vast majority of the literature has focused on Cournot competition in 
homogenous markets and obtained ambiguous conclusions. Ambiguous results 
emerge also in mixed duopolies in which firms supply differentiated products and 
compete in prices. No general conclusion, indeed, is achieved about the perverse 
behavior of WF in response to exogenous shocks.
12
  
        In summary, perverse links between demand price shocks and supply (and hence 
employment) may or may not feature oligopolistic equilibria in mixed markets both 
under Cournot and Bertrand rules. 
       As we are interested in co-ops reactions to demand shocks, the relevant 
theoretical literature is then of little help. Hence, having reached such an 
uncomfortable conclusion, we shall switch to data by exploring real mixed 
oligopolies. 
 Our empirical analysis will show two results. First: co-ops act 
countercyclically as for their employment decisions. Second: co-ops succeed in 
smoothing employment also thanks to their equity policy.  
                                                          
12
 We have performed numerical simulations (available upon request) using a model of mixed 
duopoly with horizontal product differentiation and price competition under the assumptions of 
quadratic utility function and that the production function is increasing and concave. Numerical 
examples allow showing that perverse effects can take place for some ranges of the parameters. 
Hence, again, it may or may not occur that the WF adjusts its output counter-cyclically in response 
to demand shocks. 
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        The first result has already been tested and confirmed in a group of empirical 
papers. By comparing the reactions to output demand shocks among PMFs and WFs, 
these studies conclude that there is no perverse supply effect in the behavior of WFs. 
This conclusion is shared by: Burdin and Dean (2009, 2010) looking at the Uruguay’s 
economy; Craig and Pencavel (1992, 1995) as for the plywood industry of the US 
Pacific Northwest; Pencavel et al. (2006) as for the Italian economy in the period 
1982-94.  Moreover, these papers all show that facing demand shocks, conventional 
firms tend to adjust their employment levels, whereas co-ops tend to adjust pay (at 
least to members) so that in the latter ones the employment levels turn out to more 
stable than in the former ones.  
 As for our second result, there is a tiny related empirical literature. Zevi (2005) 
offers an excellent treatment of the topic, with special reference to the Italian legal 
and institutional framework, without going into an explicit empirical analysis. 
Navarra (2009) is the paper mostly related to our as for the high rate of profit plough-
back in production co-ops. She shows evidence (from 6 years of balance sheets of  60 
production co-ops operating in an Italian province) supporting the intuition that 
accumulating collectively-owned capital is a form of collective insurance.  
         As far as we know, our paper is the first one attempting to detect co-ops 
reactions to the current crisis and show the long-run relationship between their 
employment and equity strategies. 
 
 
3. Evidence from a group of Italian production co-ops 
 
 First of all, we frame our sample within a stylized picture of the overall Italian 
cooperative economy. The alliance signed in 2011 among the three bigger Italian co-
ops associations includes 43,000 firms with 12 million members
13
 and 1.1 million 
                                                          
13 Remember that consumers’ co-ops are by far the ones with more members: for instance, 
consumers’ and housing co-ops together account for almost 90% of all Legacoop co-ops’ members 
(8.8 million in 2010). 
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workers. The total value of their sales in 2010 is about 127 billion (7.5% of Italian 
GDP).  
 We focus on production cooperatives. According to Zanotti (2012), their 
official number in 2008 is 31,378, i.e., 39.5% of  overall Italian registered co-ops. 
The biggest Italian association of production co-ops is ANCPL (Associazione 
Nazionale Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro), a branch of Legacoop. According to 
its last Social Report, in 2010 ANCPL is joined by almost 900 firms and 5 consortia. 
24,000 workers – out of 36,000 – are also members of their own co-ops. This means 
that the membership ratio (members/workers) is about 68%, whereas it is much 
higher for the smaller production co-ops joining Confcooperative, the other major 
Italian association. In 2008, the average membership ratio for all Italian co-ops is 
almost 75%. 
 Our sample is formed by cooperatives joining ANCPL; hence, it is made of 
almost 3% of all Italian production co-ops (registered at 2008) and it accounts  for 
slightly more than 2% of all Italian co-ops (associated at 2011). Our sample includes 
some of the biggest Italian co-ops in terms of volume of business. For instance, the 
10 biggest constructions co-ops joining ANCPL are ranked in the top 30 enterprises 
of the Italian constructions industry and belong to the top 50 Italian companies.
14
 
 Moreover, as for the statistical significance of our sample, notice that it 
includes co-ops employing, in 2006, very significant shares of the overall 
employment in Italian production cooperatives altogether: 23% in the constructions 
industry and 45% in the manufacturing industry.
15
 
 Firstly, we report data on sales and employment of ANCPL co-ops for the 
period 2003-2010. These figures are split into two sub-periods (2003-08 and 2008-10, 
i.e. before and after the crisis) and into three main clusters depending on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
14 Centro Studi Legacoop (2009). 
 
15 Zanotti (2012), Table 12.  
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operating sector: constructions (315 firms and 5 consortia); manufacturing (460 
firms); design, engineering and consulting (118 firms).
16
  
 We concentrate on real sales as an indicator of demand and we compare sales 
and employment (measured as the number of workers) to detect the presence of 
countercyclical trends in co-ops’ behavior.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 For all the time series, we now compute both the overall and the average yearly 
percentage changes in sales and in employment in the pre-crisis period 2003-2008 
and in the post-crisis period 2008-2010. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 It is quite apparent from Table 2 that employment does not fluctuate as much 
as sales. For instance, it turns out that in 2009, facing a dramatic fall in sales with 
respect to the previous year (- 13.28%), the overall number of workers of the co-ops 
in our sample slightly increases.  
 
3.1 The pre-crisis period (2003-08) 
 
        This period has been featured by a significant growth in all sectors of our 
sample. However, the overall increase of 15.32% in sales (equivalent to almost 3% 
average yearly increase) is matched with a substantial stability of employment 
(+0.96%). There is an especially strong countercyclical movement of employment in 
the constructions industry, where an increase of almost 25% in sales is matched with 
a 6.8% reduction in the number of workers. In the Dec and in the manufacturing 
                                                          
16 The sizes of the three industries refer to 2010.  
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industries, sales and employment both increase throughout the period, but in the vast 
majority of the period employment grows much less than sales.  
        We may claim that at the overall sample level, co-ops’ reaction to a positive 
trend in demand (and output) does not entail any significant change in the number of 
their workers.  
 
3.1.2 Large firms 
 
 If we restrict our attention to medium and large co-ops (value of sales ≥ 10 
million euro) joining Legacoop, we see that in the period 2004-2007, the trend in 
employment is again fairly countercyclical. In the manufacturing industry (30 co-
ops), nominal sales go up by almost 16% and employment by just 2% (members 
increase by 1%). In the constructions sector (66 co-ops), employment is stable (but 
members increase by more than 8%) despite a 20% increase in nominal sales.
17
   
         
3.2 The crisis period (2008-2010) 
    
       If we now look at the second column of Table 2 we realize that a significant 
countercyclical behavior occurred also during a period of falling output demand and 
sales.  
       In the constructions and manufacturing sectors employment falls to a much lower 
extent than sales. In the Dec sector, employment even increases despite an almost 
10% reduction in sales.   
      In the overall sample, the picture is similar in the two sub-periods that we have 
considered. Between 2003 and 2008, employment was substantially stable despite a 
15% increase in sales; between 2008 and 2010 employment is still substantially 
stable despite a 16% reduction in sales. 
 
                                                          
17 Centro Studi Legacoop (2009). 
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3.3 The constructions industry  
 
        We now focus on the constructions industry and we use non co-ops as a control 
sample. The constructions sector is the one in which co-ops are most significant in 
terms of sales: during the period 2003-2010, the average value of co-ops sales 
represented the 3.6% of the total industry sales. 
        Table 3 collects real sales and employment for co-ops and non co-ops.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
        If we look at the period of growing industry sales (2003-07) we see the striking 
difference between co-ops and the other firms. While non co-ops display a neat 
cyclical trend as employment grows at 12% rate while real sales are growing at 13%, 
co-ops react to a 19.3% increase in real sales with almost 8% reduction in 
employment . 
         In the constructions industry, the trend in labor productivity does not explain 
the trend in co-ops employment. According to ISTAT official statistics,
18
 indeed, the 
labor productivity in the constructions sector declined by almost 2% in the period 
2002-2009. Hence, it has been internal re-organization and greater co-ops workers’ 
productivity (and pay
19
) the likely factors explaining how such firms succeeded in 
expanding so much their output with a decreasing level of employment in the period 
2003-07.  
         On the other hand, in the 2008-10 period, the difference in co-ops vis à vis 
conventional firms’ behavior is negligible. Facing a 17.5% decline in sales, co-ops 
                                                          
18 ISTAT (various years). 
 
19 “In periods of slack demand, workers’ cooperatives may pay their members only a basic wage 
comparable to what it is paid in traditional firms. But in more prosperous periods, they often raise 
compensation with an additional variable, wage, paid as bonus, dividend or profit-sharing.”, Logue 
and Yates (2005), pp. 3-4.  
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reduced employment by 3%; similarly, conventional firms reduce their employment 
of 2% in face of a 14% fall in sales.
20
 
21
 
  
 
4. What did co-ops actually do before, during and after the crisis? 
 
 Let us start with a few facts occurred during and after the explosion of the 
crisis. In the period 2008-2010, while the real Italian GDP fell by about 7%, the net 
growth rate of the number of co-ops remains significantly positive. This happens also 
thanks to the creation of new cooperative firms through workers’ buyouts of 
conventional firms in turmoil (50 new production co-ops in the period).
22
 The number 
of bankruptcies among co-ops is significantly lower than the average (Zanotti 2012) 
also because of the mutuality operating among co-ops; co-ops joining the same 
association often help one another when needed. Such help takes sometimes the 
strong form of merging. In 2009, we witness 30 mergers among production co-ops 
(only 47 in the all period 2005-2008), mainly because “strong” co-ops have 
                                                          
20 On the other hand in the manufacturing industry, in the period 2007-2010, co-ops behave much 
better as compared to the industry trend.  While the fall in the number of their workers amounts to 
1.8%, the overall decline of employment in the industry is 8.3%, corresponding to 419,000 workers 
in the period. It is worth remembering that workers operating in ANCPL co-ops account for less 
than 0.5% of total employment in this sector. 
 
21 As a further check, we report figures from the production co-ops associated with Confcooperative 
(the second largest co-ops’ association). According to a speech of The President (Reporter.it, 
27/4/2012), in 2011 the co-ops were employing 11,700 workers (11,300 of them were also 
members). They had a stable value of nominal sales (1.3 billion) in the period 2008-11. More 
importantly, they apparently experienced an increase both in members (+ 4.6%) and in workers (+ 
7.7%) in the same period. Hence, also these figures seem to confirm the pattern already observed 
within the ANCPL sample. 
 
22 This phenomenon does not seem to apply only to Italy: for instance, as documented by the 
Financial Times (August 28, 2012, page 12), in the area of Richmond, USA, we witness a revival of 
co-ops creation. This is promoted by local authorities as part of a policy designed to contrast raising 
unemployment as a consequence of the crisis. 
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incorporated other co-ops in downturns. The success of these arrangements owes 
very much to the active role of the main co-ops’ associations. 
 In 2009, more than 14% of new employees are hired by cooperative 
enterprises, which are altogether responsible of only 6.2% of the overall Italian 
employment in that year. 
 We noticed that in the period 2008-2010, facing a serious fall in sales 
(16.23%), the co-ops of our sample respond by reducing by less than 1% their 
employment without altering the number of members.
23
 This means that cooperatives 
have managed the fall in demand by a small contraction in the number of non-
member workers, probably by means of the interruption (no renewal) of short-term 
labor contracts and the block of turnover. 
 However, if we aim at explaining why co-ops seem surviving the crisis better 
than conventional firms, it is also worth understanding their decisions about profits 
and equity over time.  
 Table 4
24
 describes the trend of (nominal values of) sales, profits and equity (= 
capital + indivisible reserves + operating profit) in the period 1994-2011. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
         Equity has been growing over time (at an average yearly rate of about 7.89%)
25
 
because of the practices undertaken by the co-ops: capital has been periodically 
revalued according to fair accounting rules; the share of profits distributed via rebate 
                                                          
23 Centro Studi Legacoop (2011). 
 
24 2004 is the first year in which figures of the Consorzio Cooperative di Costruzione (about 900 
million euro sales) are recorded in this time series. Notice that the time series for sales in Table 4 is 
different from the one reported in Table 1: although the sources overlap, the data have been 
collected with different criteria. Table 1 is based on annual social reports of ANCPL whereas Table 
4 is based on balance sheets elaborated by ANCPL and Centro Ricerche economiche e 
Monitoraggio d’impresa (CRM).  
 
25 In the same period, nominal sales and profits have evolved at an average yearly rate of +8.27% 
and -0.21%, respectively. 
14 
 
to members has been modest and often converted into an increase of the value of their 
shares; reserves have been augmented by the non distributed profits.  
         Thanks to this forward-looking strategy, co-ops are facing the crisis with a 
robust financial endowment. Non distributed profits created a sort of (partly 
intergenerational) insurance against recessions and this turns out to be beneficial first 
to members (giving up part of the pay in favor of workplace stability), but to a lower 
extent to non member workers too. Decisions about the financial structure of the firm 
seem to have acquired an insurance function, as a buffer against unpredicted negative 
contingencies.
26
  
 Unsurprisingly, equity is fairly stable in the last three years of the time series, 
meaning that in face of the crisis and the fall in demand, co-ops have been using their 
financial endowment to protect employment. Such a concern for job security may 
explain why not only Italian, but also French and Mondragon co-ops have reinvested 
higher shares of their profits than they were legally required. The intuition may be 
further enhanced by the plot of the three series in Figure 1.
27
 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 The said cooperative practice is greatly different from the one prevailing in 
conventional firms. Let us compare the rate of profit plough-back in largest co-ops 
and largest non-co-ops. In 2007 (but other years display similar patterns), almost all 
profits (92%) reaped by all biggest (with value of sales greater than 10 million euro) 
Legacoop co-ops have been devoted to strengthen reserves or increase capital. Less 
than 5% of profits are distributed in various forms to members. Quite differently, in 
                                                          
26 We owe this interpretation to an anonymous referee. 
 
27 As a further check of our results, to control for the growing trend of the three variables, we 
estimated the linear regression of Sales, Equity and Profits with respect to time and we calculated 
the residuals of the three regressions. The values of the standard deviation of the residuals are 
706,748 for Sales, 130,636 for Equity and 67,630 for Profits. This is confirming that facing large 
fluctuations in sales, co-ops react by strengthening their financial position through the equity policy 
described above. 
    
15 
 
the same year, according to the yearly Mediobanca report on the largest Italian 
companies, more than two thirds of profits have been distributed as dividends.
28
   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 In this paper we have suggested that the appropriate theoretical frame to 
examine cooperative firms is provided by models of mixed oligopoly. This is because 
co-ops actually operate in markets where they compete with profit-oriented rivals. An 
exploration of such literature indicates that perverse effects - like those emerging 
under perfect competition or monopoly - need not to feature the equilibrium of 
oligopolistic mixed markets. This theory is then of little help in shading light on the 
main question we address in the paper, that is, how cooperatives react to demand 
shocks. In fact, theoretical models of mixed oligopoly yield ambiguous results as for 
the relationship between demand shocks, on the one hand, and output/employment 
reactions on the other. To answer our basic question, we then focus on data, by 
examining trends observed in some Italian oligopolistic markets. 
          We have collected statistical evidence from a large sample of Italian production 
cooperatives operating in mixed oligopolies. Using our dataset, we have been able to 
confirm the conclusions of previous empirical research, according to which co-ops 
seem to be more concerned with employment then conventional firms.
29
 This 
ultimately results in a relative stabilization of co-ops’ employment when facing 
shocks in output demand and this behavior yields a revenue-smoothing effect on 
workers and especially on members. Moreover, we have shown that the protection of 
employment in downturns is made possible also thanks to the prolonged plough-back 
of very large fractions of co-ops profits.  
                                                          
28 Centro Studi Legacoop (2009). This comparison shows a difference between the strategies of two 
groups of firms that can be biased by the large gap in the size of the groups. We owe this remark to 
an anonymous referee. 
 
29 For instance, see Perotin (2012) for an excellent survey. 
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 A promising extension of our research might entail gathering data for other 
European countries to ascertain the presence of trends similar to the one that we 
highlighted for a group of Italian co-ops.  
 Finally, given the slow timing of procurement procedures – especially in the 
constructions industry – it may well be that the full consequences of the recession on 
employment are lagged and may become fully manifest only since 2011. Hence, a 
longer post-crisis explosion period should be considered in future research to refine 
the assessment of the reaction of different firms to external shocks. 
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 Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Sales and Employment trends in ANCPL co-ops 
               Tot 
  
              Con 
 
           Man 
 
     Dec   
Year  Sales Employment 
 
Sales Employment 
 
Sales Employment 
 
Sales Employment 
2003  7461 36550 
 
4175 17000 
 
3212 18800 
 
74 750 
2004  7895 34560 
 
4440 15000 
 
3378 18800 
 
77 760 
2005  8319 34980 
 
4735 15200 
 
3504 19000 
 
80 780 
2006  8556 35300 
 
4842 15400 
 
3631 19100 
 
83 800 
2007  8300 36664 
 
4982 15660 
 
3185 20040 
 
133 964 
2008  8604 36900 
 
5218 15830 
 
3253 20080 
 
133 964 
2009  7461 37014 
 
4599 15950 
 
2731 20060 
 
131 990 
2010  7207 36640 
 
4304 15408 
 
2783 19660 
 
120 996 
Source: ANCPL (various years). Tot: Total; Con: constructions; Man: manufacturing; Dec: design, engineering, consulting. Sales in million euro at 
2002 prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2. Overall and average yearly percentage changes over different periods: Sales and Employment 
    Overall change  Average yearly changes 
 2003/2008 2008/2010  2003/2008 2008/2010 
Sales (Tot) 15.32% -16.23%  2.94% -8.34% 
Employment (Tot) 0.96% -0.70%  0.24% -0.35% 
Sales (Con) 24.98% -17.52%  4.58% -9.14% 
Employment (Con) -6.80% -2.67%  -1.27% -1.32% 
Sales (Man) 1.28% -14.45%  0.47% -7.07% 
Employment (Man) 6.81% -2.09%  1.34% -1.05% 
Sales (Dec) 79.73% -9.77%  14.39% -4.95% 
Employment (Dec) 28.53% 3.32%  5.41% 1.65% 
Source: ANCPL (various years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Co-ops and non co-ops in the constructions sector 
      
    
 
          Co-ops 
 
                           Non co-ops 
 
  
Year   Sales  Employment  % Sales % Employment   Sales  Employment % Sales % Employment 
2003 
 
4175 17000 
 
  
122596 1729158 
  2004 
 
4440 15000 6.35 -11.76 
 
128025 1817684 4.43 5.12 
2005 
 
4735 15200 6.64 1.33 
 
132250 1897348 3.30 4.38 
2006 
 
4842 15400 2.26 1.32 
 
135874 1884871 2.74 -0.66 
2007 
 
4982 15660 2.89 1.69 
 
138441 1939527 1.89 2.90 
2008 
 
5218 15830 4.74 1.09 
 
136668 1953672 -1.28 0.73 
2009 
 
4599 15950 -11.86 0.76 
 
125325 1927846 -8.30 -1.32 
2010   4304 15408 -6.41 -3.40   117411 1914186 -6.31 -0.71 
Source: ANCPL (various years), ANCE (2012), ISTAT (various years). Sales are in million euro at 2002 prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Sales, profits and equity of ANCPL co-ops 
Year Sales Profits Equity 
  1994 3,035 93 1,363 
  1995 3,716 116 1,653 
  1996 3,897 76 1,589 
  1997 3,645 102 1,668 
  1998 4,624 116 2,076 
  1999 5,095 168 2,269 
  2000 5,753 190 2,511 
  2001 6,266 308 2,808 
  2002 6,665 125 3,005 
  2003 7,036 153 3,152 
  2004 9,300 208 3,395 
  2005 9,824 272 3,695 
  2006 9,976 267 3,959 
  2007 10,849 288 4,284 
  2008 11,750 229 4,669 
  2009 10,363 148 4,784 
  2010 10,675 88 4,759 
  2011 10,769 -1 4,792 
  Source: CRM with ANCPL Legacoop. Nominal values, 
million euro. 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Sales, equity (left axis) and profits (right axis) of the ANCPL co-ops 
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